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Most identifiers used today, such as OpenID Connect, are controlled by third
parties, which can track how the identifier is used. To overcome this, self-sovereign
identifiers, such as Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs), which are entirely owned and
managed by the user, have been developed. However, in some cases even DIDs
alone do not sufficiently protect the user’s privacy. For example, if a service can be
accessed at multiple fixed locations, using the same identifier repeatedly for each
location may over time also reveal the user’s location. One of the techniques to
hide the exact service identifiers are ring signatures, which enable the generation
of anonymous signatures where the real signer’s identity is hidden in a set of
possible signers.
This thesis takes the use case of electric vehicle charging, where the electric vehi-
cle location may be revealed if static identifiers are used by the electric vehicles
and charging stations. A previous solution uses a new ephemeral DID for every
interaction, but this requires the creation of a large number of DIDs. This the-
sis examines an alternative approach of using ring signatures to achieve better
privacy with a lower number of DIDs.
The major outcomes of this thesis include how to implement ring signatures
for anonymous authentication, comparison of resource consumption with respect
to the previous solution, and the applicability of ring signature technology on a
broader scale such as in constrained devices. The performance of the new solution
was compared with the existing solution by implementing prototypes on Android
phones, which communicate over Bluetooth. An assumption on the number of
charging events was made based on real data for the country of Norway. The
results show that ring signatures are easy to implement and provide slightly better
privacy but they are significantly more resource-intensive in terms of storage
(about 2 times more) and processing (about 9 times slower). Therefore, large
scale implementation of ring signatures on the constrained devices is challenging.
Keywords: Decentralized Identifiers, Ring Signatures, Privacy, Electric
Vehicle Charging, Internet of Things
Language: English
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Abbreviations and Acronyms
BLE Bluetooth Low Energy
CS Charging Station
CSO Charging Station Owner
DID Decentralised Identifier
DSO Distribution System Operator
ER Energy Retailer
EV Electric Vehicle
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EVU Electric Vehicle User
IoT Internet-of-Things
JSON Javascript Object Notation
JWS JSON Web Signature
MitM Man-in-the-Middle
NFC Near Field Communication
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
RSA Rivest, Shamir & Adleman (public key cryptosystem)
SSI Self-Sovereign Identity
TSO Transmission System Operator
UUID Universally Unique Identifier
VC Verifiable Credential
ZKP Zero-Knowledge Proof
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Privacy is necessary for an open society in the electronic age. According
to Langheinrich [32], privacy is built on the trust that a service respects
the user’s information. In a privacy protecting service, users know when
and what data is being collected and user consent is explicitly required.
Additionally, privacy preserving services must not force users for consent to
give non-essential personal information in order to use the services such as is
the case with many dominant companies like Facebook and Google. Thus, a
balance between control and convenience is important.
Digital identifiers are essential for entities to interact with each other,
they are used in almost all services for differentiating the users. Digital
identifiers, or simply identifiers, uniquely identify an entity among others.
An identifier is typically a string of characters, that is uniquely associated
with a subset of attributes about an entity. Identifiers are important not
only for identification, but also for access control, personalisation and keeping
historical information. However, while identifiers are useful for its user, if the
user’s data leaks into other domains, the same identifier enables correlation
and harms user’s privacy.
Privacy violations occur when information along with the associated iden-
tifier divulged in one context leaks into another. Thus, identifiers should be
designed to be privacy protecting. Traditional identifier solutions such as
OpenID Connect [51], Shibboleth [14] and Kerberos [58] are centralised so-
lutions which are managed by a third-party authority which may not have
user’s privacy as their prime interest. The central authority may collect in-
formation about the identifier use, such as the services being accessed, time
of use, frequency, etc. Identifiers held centrally puts user’s privacy at risk
as they become attractive targets for hackers. An dishonest authority may
even choose to sell those identifiers and the usage data.
That is why self-sovereign identifier systems [62] have been developed
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which advocate that identifiers should be owned by the entities using it [53].
Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) [45] is one such technology which allows
entities to create self-sovereign identities, i.e. create and manage their own
identity completely independent of any authority. The owner of the identifier
has full control over its use, sharing and invalidation. DIDs are designed to
be pseudonymous and thus several DIDs can be used simultaneously by a
user. Therefore, DIDs enable the user to manage multiple identities with
different services without a risk of correlation by someone with access to the
interaction data.
However in some cases, more privacy is desired and users wish to au-
thenticate anonymously to the service. These are cases where the user can
use one of the several service locations and it is not required by the service
provider to exactly know the location where services are accessed. For ex-
ample, at an automated kiosk machine, the user needs to prove his identity
to the kiosk company to get billed and optionally get discounted prices. The
kiosk company however does not need to know which kiosk outlet was used
for the purchase. Another example could be a door access system to a build-
ing. The building security might need to make sure the person accessing the
premises has the rights to do so without necessarily knowing the exact gate
used for entry. Protection of location information is important as location
is very personal information about the user. Location information may be
sold for profit to advertisers e.g. location based spamming or it might even
be used for more sinister purposes such as tracking, stalking, kidnapping,
robbery, etc.
Ring signatures, first proposed by Rivest et. al. [47], is a technique which
enables generation of anonymous signatures by hiding the true signer in a
set of possible signers. The set of possible signers can be created without the
involvement of the other signers and is called a ‘ring’ due to the shape of the
mathematical structure involved. This thesis hypotheses that in situations
where it is sufficient to prove that an entity is one of the permitted users of the
‘ring’, ring signatures can be used as method for anonymous authentication.
This thesis also investigates the suitability of ring signatures and the possible
privacy improvements using the use case detailed in the next subsection.
1.1 Use Case
This thesis takes the use case of charging of electric vehicles. The use case is
adopted from Antonino’s thesis [5] which proposes a privacy preserving sys-
tem for managing identifiers and authentication for Electric Vehicles (EVs)
and Charging Stations (CSs) for a grid balancing electric vehicle charging
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scenario. The system aims to balance the grid’s energy flow by diverting
electric vehicle charging to districts with surplus energy and yet, protect the
location privacy of Electric Vehicle Users (EVUs). Regulation of energy con-
sumption is required to prevent reverse power flows which can be harmful to
the grid [56].
The solution defines the players and information required by each party
such that each party has just enough information to allow the energy distrib-
utors and sellers to track usage and correctly bill customers without violating
the EVU’s privacy. The six players associated in the use case are as follows:
1. Distribution System Operator (DSO) manages the high-voltage infras-
tructure transmitting energy from production plants to municipalities
and the grid delivering energy to end customers, e.g. houses and small
businesses. DSO typically divides its coverage area into different en-
ergy districts. Districts facilitate in balancing consumption of energy —
surplus energy from one district is routed to energy deficient districts.
2. Charging Stations (CSs) are service points where electricity can be
accessed from the grid for charging.
3. Charging Station Owners (CSOs) are independent entities which own
CSs located in one or more districts.
4. Energy Retailers (ERs) provide charging services to their customers in
partnership with CSO. ERs also fulfil the role of mediators matching
the energy needs of the DSO with the charging needs of their customers.
5. Electric Vehicles (EVs) interacts with the grid by consuming electricity
via CSs.
6. Electric Vehicle Users (EVUs) are users of the EVs. EVUs become
customers of one or more ERs of their choice to get charging service.
The market relationships are defined as follows and also defined in Figure
1:
• A DSO has agreements with one or more charging station owners
(CSOs) which have deployed CSs in one or more energy districts.
• A DSO has agreements with one or more ERs to allow them to sell
energy to their customers.
• EVUs are customers of ER. An ER has contracts with several different
customer EVUs, and each EVU can be a customer of one or more ERs.
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Figure 1.1: Entity-relationship scheme showing the different relationships
among the players in the market. [5]
• An ER can provide its services through the CSs belonging to one or
more CSOs.
• The CSs of a CSO can be used by one or more ERs.
The payment relationship dictates the amount of information each party
actually requires. Every time an EV charges at a charging station (CS), a
charging event takes place which produces details such as the specific CS and
the EV involved as a transaction log. The ERs bill the EVUs at the end of
the billing period and pay the CSOs based on the amount of energy charged
through the CSs. Thus, ERs must be able to demand payment from the
EVUs, and CSOs must be able to claim payments from ERs by proving the
authenticity of the charging events. The charging event authenticity must
also be proved to the DSO for ER to claim reward for its grid balancing
efforts. The payment resolution is achieved through the transaction logs.
However, the the transaction log reveals the CS identifier to all parties
which is a threat to the location privacy of the EVUs. A district-level gran-
ularity for charging events is sufficient for the DSO to verify that the cus-
tomers of a specific ER have charged for a certain amount of energy within
that district. Similarly, the ER needs only information about the CSO, for
billing purposes, without the need to identify the specific CS that took part
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in the charging event. Finally, CSOs only need to authenticate that EVUs
are customers of the ER and do not require the EVU’s identity.
Therefore, the privacy protection of the EVU in the use case is a dou-
ble problem. Firstly, the EV must authenticate anonymously at the CS to
protect its location privacy from the CSO. And secondly, the CS must au-
thenticate itself anonymously to the ER as otherwise the CS identity, and
therefore also the location of the EVU, is revealed to the ER through the
transaction logs. The proposed system by Antonino [5] created different
DIDs for both the EVs and CSs for each charging transaction to protect
the EVU privacy. However, this approach leads to creation and storage of a
large number of DIDs and correspondingly increases the amount of resource
consumption.
1.2 Scope and Research Questions
This thesis focuses on the interaction between the EV and CS during the
charging event and the payment resolution between the CSO, ER and DSO
with the aim to satisfy all the privacy requirements discussed before and yet
provide sufficient billing evidence. To protect the privacy of the EVU, this
thesis designs an alternate solution using ring signature. It investigates the
suitability of using ring signatures for the CSs to sign the transactions instead
of creating new CS identifiers (DIDs) at every charging event. As the ER and
DSO should be able to identify the location of a charging event at the district
level instead of the exact location, the charging data could be signed with a
ring signature containing all the charging stations in that district as the set
of possible signers. A ring signature could be created by any CS in a district
but the signature would not reveal the identity of the real signer. A verifier
can then verify that the transaction happened in some CS in that district
without knowing the exact CS identity. The relative performance of ring
signatures with respect to using just DIDs is also compared by simulating
the charging event on mobile devices (Android smartphones). More precisely,
the thesis answers the following research questions:
1. RQ1: How should the charging events be logged and signed with Ring
Signatures without revealing personal information of the user and yet
prove the authenticity of the charging transaction to the CSO, ER, and
DSO?
2. RQ2: How does the use of Ring Signatures along with Decentralized
Identifiers, as opposed to using just Decentralized Identifiers, affect the
protection of privacy for EVUs in the use case?
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3. RQ3: What is the effect of using Ring Signatures on the resource
consumption and the transaction time of the system in the use case?
4. RQ4: What effect do Ring Signatures have on the deployability of the
system on constrained devices?
5. RQ5: How do Ring Signatures affect the use of Decentralized Identi-
fiers on a broader scale?
1.3 Structure
The rest of the document is structured as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the
key technologies including Decentralized Identifiers and Ring Signatures and
the related research in the field of privacy protection as well as describes the
baseline design used for comparison in the thesis. Chapter 3 describes the
design choices and the modified design. Chapter 4 provides implementation
details of both the baseline and modified design. Chapter 5 presents the re-
sults from the experiments and its analysis. Chapter 6 addresses the research
questions and discusses the outcome of the study. Chapter 7 presents future
work. And finally, Chapter 8 concludes the thesis.
Chapter 2
Related Work
This section presents the related work done in the field of privacy in IoT in-
teractions. First, it explains the key technologies used in this thesis such as
Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs), Verifiable Credentials (VCs) and Ring Sig-
natures. Then, it presents privacy enhancing techniques developed for IoT
Devices. Next, it describes the location privacy preservation techniques spe-
cific to electric vehicle charging. After that, it presents the privacy preserving
system developed by Antonino [5] for a grid balancing electric vehicle charg-
ing scenario . And lastly, it describes the improved electric vehicle charging
design developed by Antonino et. al. [6] which is used as the baseline design
in this thesis for comparison.
2.1 Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs)
Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) [45] are a self-sovereign identifier technology
being developed by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). The major
advantage of DIDs is that the DID infrastructure is decoupled from a single
authority and therefore DIDs provide more privacy and control to the users
by allowing to create, manage and destroy DIDs without interference from
another party. DIDs are based on public key cryptography and one or more
key-pairs can be generated by the user for a DID. DIDs are extensible and
many standards and versions of DIDs exist, but broadly they are of two types
— public DID and peer DID.
Public DIDs are known publicly available and are meant to used by mul-
tiple entities to communicate with the DID owner. The keys associated with
public DIDs are made public via writing on a distributed ledger, a Domain
Name System (DNS) or a website. Distributed ledgers can act as a Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI), adding trust to a public DID as legitimate iden-
13
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tifier of public identities such as institutions. Distributed ledgers may be
implemented as one of the several types of blockchain instances available
such as Sovrin [62] which uses its own identity blockchain, and uPort [35]
which uses the Ethereum network [65]. Newer blockchain technologies have
more efficient cryptographic properties [44] and have the potential to provide
consensus with less resource consumption.
However, public DIDs are unsuitable for use as ephemeral identifiers i.e.
using identifiers for just one interaction. Writing the DID and its associ-
ated key to ledger is not only unnecessary but also a risk for privacy as the
keys are required to be known only to the entity being communicated with.
Writing to public ledgers usually costs money and it becomes expensive and
wasteful when DIDs usage is short-lived and not even required to be pub-
licly accessible. Furthermore, resolving a key associated with a public DID
is slower than resolving peer DIDs due to the network overhead from reading
the ledger.
On the other hand, peer DIDs [42] are not required to be written on the
ledger. Peer DIDs are free from this requirement as they encode their keys
into the DID itself making the keys readily available to the communicating
party. Therefore, peer DIDs are suitable for use as ephemeral identifiers.
All kinds of DIDs and the associated secret keys are stored securely in
identity wallets [25]. Identity wallets prevent leak of secret keys by allowing
the use of secret keys eg. signing, without bringing the keys out of the
wallet. An identity wallet is accessed with a master password known only to
the wallet owner.
2.2 Verifiable Credentials (VCs)
Verifiable Credentials (VCs) [55] are another technology being developed by
W3C which complements DIDs in creating a decentralised and verifiable iden-
tifier system. A verifiable credential is a signed document containing a set of
claims about a subject. VCs are digital world equivalents of physical proofs
such as drivers licence, birth certificate, etc. VCs, like DIDs, can be stored
securely in identity wallets. VCs facilitate making claims with the help of
proofs created by the issuer. There are different types of proofs which can be
used in VCs [20] such as Zero Knowledge Proof (ZKP) and JSON Web Sig-
nature (JWS) [29]. The ZKPs are complex structures but provide advanced
properties such as anonymous presentation of the credential and selective
disclosure of claims. The JWS type verifiable credentials are cryptographi-
cally much simpler and therefore are suitable for making simple claims. One
of the signature schemes recently developed for elliptic key cryptography is
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the JCS Ed25519 Signature 2020 [16]. The JCS Ed25519 Signature 2020
normalises the VC data using the JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS) [49]
and creates signatures using the Ed25519 signature algorithm [10].
One of the ways to represent VCs is using linked data structures [19]
such as JSON-LD [54], which is a lightweight syntax to serialise Linked Data
into JSON. The credentials consist of context, subject and the proof. The
context contains a URI which links to a documents explaining all the fields
and usage and policies of the credential. The subject is the data which is
authorised such as DID or other claims. The proof contains the signature
of the credential issuer and other information about the signature such as
algorithm, timestamp and verification methods.
2.3 Ring Signatures
Ring signatures are a technique to create anonymous signatures. They were
first proposed by Rivest [47] and then redefined by Bender [8]. Ring sig-
natures hide the identity of the real signer in a set of possible signers called
the ‘ring’. The number of signers in ring is called the ring size. The ring
formation does not require the participation or permission from the other
signers. The generation of a ring signature involves first choosing random
values for each of the non signers and then finding the correct value for the
signer to satisfy a condition. The real signer is able to do find such a value as
it knows the secret key. The detailed construction process of ring signatures
is complex and therefore is not described here. Readers are encouraged read
the construction in the original paper [47]. Other variants of ring signatures
have also been developed such as threshold ring signatures and linkable ring
signatures [40]. Ring Signatures can be created using any signing algorithm
such as RSA or Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA) [52].
This thesis uses the Ed25519 signing algorithm [10], a type of EdDSA, which
is based on the Curve25519 [9].
2.4 Enhancing Privacy in IoT Devices
An analysis of identifiers in popular IoT platforms including oneM2M [60]
and FIWARE [15] has been done by H. Aftab et al. [2]. However, adopting a
resource based approach to identification, they use static identifiers and do
not analyse privacy threats to using static identifiers.
While communicating with an external party, IoT devices need to use
pseudonymous identifiers to hide their identity. However, when the same
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identifier is used, over time it can be correlated and mined for behavioural
pattern. To address this issue, the use of new identifier for each interaction
has been suggested by Kortesniemi et al. [30].
The use of DIDs for securing IoT device registration and software update
in 5G has been shown by Ansey et. al. [4]. An attempt to decentralise
OpenId Connect by using distributed ledger backed DIDs and VCs has been
presented by Lux et al. [36]. DID is a new technology and hence there is
limited work available which optimise their use for services.
Bender et al. [8] suggest the use of ring signatures to provide a member
of a certain class of users access to a particular resource without explicitly
identifying this member. Ring signature can provide undeniable proof that
such a resource has been accessed. The use of ring signature for preserving
privacy in digital transactions such as e-payments and e-voting services has
been proposed by Malina et al. [37]. While their design provides authenti-
cation and anonymity within the group, it does not specify any method to
prove authentication to a third party. Improved ring signatures using the
Rabin cryptosystem has been proposed but not yet implemented [37].
In comparison, work by Yang et al. [66] presents the use of Zero Knowl-
edge Proofs (ZKP) as anonymous credentials for anonymous authentication
but lacks a full communication protocol. A privacy preserving authentica-
tion protocol for IoT devices has been proposed by Wang [63], but since the
protocol uses group signatures, it requires additional steps such as group
creation, key distribution and expensive cryptographic operations.
2.5 Location Privacy of Electric Vehicles (EVs)
The state of art EV charging infrastructure involves EVUs using ER specific
mobile application, and authenticating themselves with registered username
and password, or alternatively using ER issued RFID tags. Both the mech-
anisms use static identifiers that reveal EVU’s location to the CSO and the
ER. Furthermore, payments are usually done via credit card which again
unnecessarily reveals EVU information [24].
Location privacy protection for EVs is a much researched field and several
privacy preserving methods have been proposed. Au et al. [7] have developed
a privacy preserving payment scheme using Zero Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs)
for transactions and stored balance accounts for payments. However, since
the cryptographic operations involved in ZKP are intensive, CS operations
are offloaded to a billing server. Other methods use a trusted third-party
which performs aggregation of data from geographically co-located consumers
so that service provider can still get an aggregate view of the transaction
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events for a street or district, but not for a single customer [31]. The reader
is encouraged to refer to Antonino’s thesis [5] which provides extensive related
work in this field (in Section 3) such as the use of escrow for safe payment
schemes and the use of group and ring signatures and hence has not been
repeated here.
2.6 Privacy Preserving and Grid Balancing
EV Charging
Antonino’s privacy preserving system [5] for a grid balancing electric vehicle
charging scenario which was introduced in Section 1.1 is explained in more
details here. The system uses different DIDs and VCs for the EV and CS
for each charging transaction. DIDs are also used for the credential issuers
i.e. the Charging Station Owner (CSO) and the Energy Retailer (ER). The
charging transactions are signed by the EV and are later used for payment
resolution by the CSO, ER and the DSO at the end of the billing cycle. The
service location is divided into districts by the Distribution System Opera-
tor (DSO) and the electric grid is balanced by scheduling charging events to
district with power surplus. Scheduling is done using economic incentives.
The DSO rewards the ER for consuming surplus electricity in a district in a
given time period and the ER offers discounts to EVUs to encourage charging
in the target district. The location privacy of the EVU is protected by the
division of knowledge between the involved parties i.e. CSO, ER and DSO
as shown in Figure 2.1. Following the principle of least information, none
of the parties has enough information to identify the EVU location provided
there is no collusion between the parties. The CSO knows the location of
the transaction but knows only anonymous identifier of the EVU (its DID).
Similarly, the ER knows the EVU identity but only knows the anonymous
identifier of the CS. The DSO does not know the identity of both the CS and
the EV. The system does not provide implementation details but suggested
the use of Hyperledger Indy [34] for DID and VC creation.
2.7 Multi-DID Design for Privacy Preserving
EV Charging
Starting from the design laid down in Antonino’s thesis [5], an improved
design has been developed jointly with Antonino et al. [6], henceforth re-
ferred to as the Multi-DID Design. The original design has been refined by
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CS/CSO	domain ER/EV	domain
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REAL	IDENTITY
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ER	INFO
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Figure 2.1: The different knowledge domains of the use case described. Solid
arrows indicate personally identifiable information. Dashed arrows indicate
information that do not relate to a single entity (either CS or EV) [5]
adding more details and made more efficient and secure by incorporating
Peer DID [42], DID Exchange Protocol [50], Linked Data Proofs [19], hash
chain based micropayments [46], and credential reorganisation.
2.7.1 Credential Generation
The Multi-DID Design uses two kinds of credentials for authorisation of the
DIDs used by the EV and CS. Firstly, the credential used by the EV is called
the EV Credential. The EVU registers itself as a customer with one or more
ERs as a customer to be able to charge their EV. The ER may verify the EV
and EVU using its own authentication mechanism. Before using the charging
event, the EV generates DIDs, henceforth called EV DIDs, and sends them
to the ER. The ER issues credentials to the EV, where the subject of the
credential is a single EV DID. The EV Credential validates the owner of the
EV DID for charging at CSs which have an agreement to provide service
for the ER. At the end of the billing period, the EV Credentials enable the
verification of transaction logs to the CSO and the DSO. The EV Credential
CHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK 19
can be verified using the public DID of the ER denoted as ER DID. The
associated public key of ER DID is resolved on the distributed ledger. Since
EV DID should not be reused to protect the privacy of EVU, EV can request
as many credentials as needed (up to a limit) from the ER. The EV Credential
is valid for 5 days.
Secondly, the credential used by the CS is called the CS Credential. Each
day, the CS creates as many DIDs as the number of charging transactions
expected and forwards the DIDs to the CSO. These DIDs are called CS
DIDs and in order to protect the EVU’s location privacy, the CS must use
a CS DID only once. The district where the CS is located in is known by
the CSO and is denoted by the district ID. The CSO issues CS Credentials
which have a single CS DID and the District ID as the subject. The CSO
should provide the correct District ID as the DSO has smart meters installed
at the CSs from which energy consumption is monitored. If a CSO issues
credentials with false District IDs, the total electricity consumed readings
from the smart meters will not match with the total consumption from the
transaction details and his fraud will be caught. Just before the charging
event, the CS Credential enables a CS to authorise itself to the EV as a valid
charging station. At the end of billing period, the CS Credential proves the
authenticity of the transaction log to the ER and the DSO. The CS Credential
can be verified using the public DID of the CSO denoted as CSO DID. The
associated public key of CSO DID is also resolved on the distributed ledger.
The CS Credential is valid for 3 days.
2.7.2 Exchange Messages and Presentations
The EV and CS communicate over a wireless channel such as Bluetooth dur-
ing the charging event using peer DIDs. The DID Exchange Protocol [50] is
used to securely exchange the EV DID and CS DID. The DID Exchange Pro-
tocol is a 4-way handshake protocol and involves the messages: exchange in-
vitation, exchange request, exchange response, and exchange complete. The
exchange invitation is the only message which is sent unencrypted and pro-
vides a public key to bootstrap the communication. With the exchange re-
quest and exchange response messages the communication parties exchange
their peer DIDs with each other. Finally, the exchange complete message
confirms the DID exchange. The exchange messages between EV and CS are
shown in Figure 2.2.
Along with the exchange response and exchange complete messages, cre-
dentials and presentations are also sent. Presentations are proof of creden-
tial ownership. The presentation consists of two fields: the claims and the
proof. The proof field in presentation specify the signature algorithm, time
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For i in
1..N
EVU EV CS
7. Exchange Request{ ECS_INV_KEY(EV DID) }
9. Exchange Response {
EEV_DID( CS DID, CS Credential, CS Presentation) }
10. Verify CS
Presentation +
Generate Hashchain +
Create Payment
Commitment
8. Choose CS DID
  + 
Generate CS
Presentation
1. Broadcast 
Service UUID, CS Name
11. Exchange Complete { 
ECS_DID( EV Credential, 
Payment Commitment{cs-did, w0, n, p} ) }
12. Verify Payment
Commitment
Trust
Established
14 (a). Reveal next hash step, ECS_DID(w[i])
3. Exchange Invitation {CS_INV_KEY}
Check
hash
step
2. Connect
4. Show
Details
5. Confirm
13. Charging
Agreement
16. ACK
15. Terminate
Charging
6.
Choose
EV DID
14 (b). Release Microcharge
Figure 2.2: Details of Charging Event in reference design
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of creation, verification method and the signature value. The signature in a
presentation demonstrates the ownership of the peer DID used by the pre-
sentation creator. Thus, the EV and CS mutually authenticate each other’s
peer DIDs by exchanging presentations.
The presentation created by CS is called CS Presentation and it consists
of a signature on the EV DID received from EV, created with the secret key
associated to the CS DID. The CS Presentation and CS Credential together
prove the authenticity of the CS to the EV. On the other hand, the presen-
tation created by the EV is called the Payment Commitment. The Payment
Commitment is signed by the EV using the secret key associated with the
EV DID. The Payment Commitment and the EV Credential together prove
that EV is authorised by the ER to charge.
The Payment Commitment is a proof that the EV has agreed to charge.
Once the EV and CS have mutually authenticated each other, the charg-
ing of the EV commences using a payment protocol based on the payword
micropayments scheme [46]. The micropayments scheme uses hash chains
to securely pay a large amount in small increments. The basic idea is that
a secret random value is repeatedly hashed ‘n’ times and each hash value
is stored. The last hashed value is called the root of the hash chain ‘w0’.
Then, at every hash chain step the pre-image of the last hash is revealed
and the CS releases the amount of electric charge corresponding to that step
‘p’. This process continues iteratively until the required amount is charged or
the maximum length of chain ‘n’ is reached. Using micropayments minimises
financial risk for both parties as the cost of single request not being fulfilled
by the CS or inversely, non payment by EV is quite low. Thus, the Payment
Commitment consists of the following values: CS DID received from the CS
(cs-did), root of the hash chain (w0), the maximum length of the hash chain
(n) and amount of charge to be released per hash chain step (p).
2.7.3 Charging Transaction
The details of the charging transaction in the Multi-DID Design are described
here. The steps are indicated in Figure 2.2 and explained as follows:
1. CS broadcasts its availability by advertising a custom service UUID,
CS name, and socket number. The service UUID is already known to
the EV and the CS name and socket number are printed on the CS.
A EV in the vicinity, scans the nearby devices and filters target CSs
based on the service UUID, CS name and socket number.
2. EV connects to the CS and preferred connection parameters are nego-
tiated. For the Bluetooth implementation, notification are also need to
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be enabled as explained in Chapter 4.
3. CS sends the Exchange Invitation after connection establishment to
start the communication. The Exchange Invitation contains static pub-
lic key of the CS, CS INV KEY, which is used for encrypted commu-
nication with CS.
4. EV shows the discovered CS and its details to EVU.
5. EVU confirms the details of the CS and the charging intent. No actions
are required from the EVU after this step.
6. EV chooses one of the EV DIDs from its wallet.
7. EV creates the Exchange Request and sends it to CS. The Exchange
Request is encrypted with CS INV KEY and contains the EV DID.
8. CS chooses a CS DID and the corresponding CS Credential from its
wallet. CS also generates a CS Presentation by signing the EV DID
with private key associated with the CS DID.
9. CS the sends the Exchange Response which contains the CS DID, CS
Credential, CS Presentation and also the charging options. The charg-
ing options are the supported values for max hash chain length and the
charge amount for each step. The message in encrypted with public
key associated with the EV DID.
10. EV verifies the CS Credential and the CS Presentation. Then, it gener-
ates the Payment Commitment. The Payment Commitment is signed
with private key associated with the EV DID.
11. EV sends the Exchange Complete which contains the EV Credential
and the Payment Commitment. The messages is encrypted with public
key associated with the CS DID.
12. CS verifies the Payment Commitment after which the EV and CS have
established trust with each other.
13. If the CS agrees to the terms in the payment commitment, it sends a
charging agreement message to the EV. CS then waits for the reception
of the hash chain steps.
14. This step is repeated for the number of hash chain steps used — (a)
EV reveals the next hash chain step value. The message is encrypted
using public key associated with the CS DID. (b) CS upon receiving
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this message, verifies the hash chain step and releases a micro-charge of
amount equal to the step charge mentioned in Payment Commitment.
15. After required amount of charging has been done, the EV sends a charg-
ing termination request.
16. Upon receiving a termination request, the CS sends an acknowledge-
ment of successful termination.
2.7.4 Payment Resolution
After the charging event, the CS stores the last revealed hash chain value wk
where k is the number of micropayments used. The Payment Commitment,
CS Presentation, wk, and k together are called the Transaction Log. The CS
sends the Transaction Log along with the EV Credential for each charging
event to the CSO. At the end of the billing period, Transaction Log for all
charging events in the period and the associated credentials are shared with
the ER and DSO as shown in Figure 2.3
1. With the Transaction Log, EV Credential and CS Credential, the CSO
is able to:
(a) Identify the CS involved in the transaction from the CS DID in
the Payment Commitment and the district the CS is located in
from the CS Credential.
(b) Identify the ER of which the EVU is a customer and thus demand
payment from the ER for the services rendered.
(c) Identify the amount of energy used for charging from the amount
of charge per step ‘p’ and the number of micropayments ‘k’.
(d) Identify the time of the transaction from the timestamp in the
Payment Commitment.
2. Similarly, with the Transaction Log, EV Credential and CS Credential,
the ER is able to:
(a) Identify only the district the transaction happened from the CS
Credential. This is because the CS DIDs are different in each
transaction and ER does not know the real identity associated
with the CS DIDs.
(b) Identify the CSO whose CS provided the charging service and thus
make payments to that CSO appropriately.
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(c) Identify the amount of energy used for charging from the amount
of charge per step ‘p’ and the number of micropayments ‘k’.
(d) Identify the EVU who made use of the charging service from the
EV DID in the EV Credential and appropriately bill them.
(e) Identify the time of the transaction from the timestamp in the
Payment Commitment.
3. And finally, with the Transaction Log, EV Credential and CS Creden-
tial, the DSO is able to:
(a) Identify the only the district the transaction happened from the
CS Credential. This is because the CS DIDs are different in each
transaction and DSO does not know the real identity associated
with the CS DIDs.
(b) Identify the ER involved in the transaction from the EV Credential
and reward the ER appropriately.
(c) Identify the amount of energy used for charging from the amount
of charge per step ‘p’ and the number of micropayments ‘k’. The
DSO sums the total energy used per district and decides the degree
of the ER’s contribution to grid balancing.
(d) Identify the time of the transaction from the timestamp in the
Payment Commitment.
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CS CSO ER DSOEVU
Rewards
Payment
Bill with Discounts 
where  abbreviations denote : PC: Payment Commitment { CS DID, w0, n, p }
LH: Last hash chain value wk + No of hash chain iterations k
CS Cred: CS Credential
EV Cred: EV Credential
PC, LH, EV Cred
PC, LH, CS Cred
PC, LH, CS Cred, EV Cred
Figure 2.3: Flow of Charging Transaction Logs in Multi-DID Design
Chapter 3
System Design
This section describes the Ring Signature Design which uses ring signatures
for privacy preserving EV charging. First, it discusses the design choices
made. Then, it describes the assumptions taken for the design. Thereafter,
it shows the modifications made to the Multi-DID Design for integrating
ring signatures in terms of credential generation, messages and presentations,
charging event, and payment resolution. Finally, the limitations of the design
are described.
Mainly three changes were done in the Multi-DID design for using ring
signature:
1. the CS DID is reused for multiple transactions and used for as long as
the CS credential is valid e.g. a month,
2. the CS credential is modified to include CS DIDs belonging to all CSs
in the district,
3. and finally, the CS DID in the Payment Commitment is replaced with
a ring signature created by the CS.
3.1 Design Choices
This section describes the various design choices made for the Ring Signature
Design in terms of identifiers used, type of signatures, credential formats and
the threat model.
3.1.1 Identifiers and Ledger
DIDs provide a standard and secure way to communication without interfer-
ence from a central authority. Public and peer DIDs have different properties
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which make them suitable for different operations. Public DIDs, which are
useful where long lived relationships are to be maintained, have been used for
the service providing entities, i.e., the CSO and the ER. On the other hand,
the peer DIDs are suitable for use as ephemeral identifiers and therefore, they
have been used for the EV and CS whose interactions are temporary. The
properties of public and peer DIDs are presented in Table 3.1.
DID Type Public Peer
Used By ER, CSO EV, CS
Key Source Ledger Encoded in DID
Key Resolution Slow Fast
Method did:sov did:peer
Table 3.1: Comparison of public and peer DIDs
Since ER DID and CSO DID is used to issue credentials that must be
verified by third parties, they need to be publicly resolvable. The public
DIDs used in the design are based on the Hyperledger Indy [34] because
of it provides a full ecosystem for managing DIDs such as ledgers, wallets,
encryption standards [26], etc. In Hyperledger Indy, the public DIDs are
written in a Hyperledger Indy ledger pool of observer and validator nodes.
Hyperledger Indy relies on a permissioned distributed ledger and is managed
by trustees, stewards, endorsers, and users. Hyperledger Indy acts as a PKI
to reliably resolve DIDs for CSO, ER and DSO by the other entities and thus
removes the need for installing device certificates inside EVs and CSs. The
public DIDs are denoted using the method did:sov and a 16 byte random
string as identifier.
3.1.2 Ring Signatures
Ring signatures and group signatures [13] both allow creation of anonymous
signatures. However, group signatures are based on cryptographic algorithms
which are considerably more complex than ring signatures. Group signature
operations for signature generation and verification take several seconds on
mobile devices [43]. Furthermore, group signatures require the participation
of all members for group creation and therefore group signatures have not
been used in the design.
Ring signatures on the other hand are much simpler operations. Ring
signature performance degrades linearly with number of members in the ring.
Several kinds of ring signatures schemes providing special properties have
been proposed and analysed [38]. However, specialised ring signatures are
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generally more complex and a simple ring signatures was sufficient for this
thesis.
3.1.3 Credentials
Credentials provided by the Hyperledger Indy are based on ZKP and there-
fore are significantly resource consuming and unsuitable for deployment on
constrained devices. Although they provided features such as selective dis-
closure and anonymous presentation, these features were not required for
the use case. Therefore, the credentials used in the thesis were designed
from Linked Data Proofs [19] syntax with detached JWS for signatures. The
credentials were designed to be disclosed in full during presentation.
Additionally, presentations in Hyperledger Indy are transferable, which
means a presentation can be forwarded by an entity who does not own the cre-
dential. This vulnerability can be exploited for a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM)
attack. Thus, credentials used in the design expose the holder DID (or set
of possible holder DIDs in case of Ring Signature Design). The credentials
are presented with a fresh signature created by the secret keys associated
with the holder DID mentioned in the credential. Using the same DID for
communication which is also included in credentials prove to the other party
that the presenter of the credential is the legitimate owner of the credential.
3.1.4 Threat Model
An attacker might try to capture the communication traffic between EV and
CS to get information about the EVU such as ER name, amount charged
etc. Therefore, all communication except for the connection invitation was
encrypted following the principle of least information. The CS INV KEY
securely bootstraps the connection and the other messages in the protocol
are encrypted with keys associated with peer DIDs of EV and CS.
As Bluetooth devices are inexpensive, it is easy for an attacker to install
small devices near the station to set up fake CS services to steal credentials
and Payment Commitments from the EVs. Another possible attack related
to Bluetooth communication could be that the EVU is not plugged in to the
correct charging socket and accidentally pays for the charging of the attacker.
This seems to be an unlikely attack because the attacker then must be present
at the same CS and would be caught. The CS Name and socket number are
advertised via Bluetooth and the same are also printed clearly at the CS.
Thus, there should be no confusion about which socket the EV is attached
to and which CS socket the EV application is communicating with. If there
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is a competing CS peripheral advertising the same socket number, the EVU
is able to visually inspect if its the correct CS.
Lastly, another threat could be the evasion of full payment by the EV for
electricity received from the CS or alternately the CS not supplying the full
charge for the payment from the EV. The micropayments scheme described
earlier protects both parties from this kind of fraud.
3.2 Assumptions
Assumptions made for the Ring Signature Design are listed in this subsection.
The same assumption are also applicable for the Multi-DID Design.
• There is no collusion between the CSO and ER to combine the infor-
mation stored by them about the EVU to reveal the EVU’s identity
and other information.
• A distributed ledger is run and managed by stewards which may be
entities representing the interests of the parties involved e.g. a con-
sortium of EVU organisation, CSOs, ERs and governmental regulatory
authorities.
• The public DIDs for the ER and the CSO are written on the distributed
ledger and the associated public keys are rotated periodically to main-
tain security of the system. The DID values, i.e. ER DID and CSO
DID, are known by EVU and CS to be as legitimate.
• Key rotation is performed regularly by the CSO and ER. CSO and ER
verification keys are rotated such that already issued credentials do not
get invalidated. This is done by coordinating the key rotation time and
credential validity.
• The communicating parts of the EV and CS are IoT devices with
enough computation capabilities to perform public key cryptography
and equipped with low power wireless communication capability such
as Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE). They have access to the internet for
downloading credentials, although internet access is not required during
the charging event.
• The DSO has smart meters installed at each CS providing it with in-
formation about total electricity used in a time period.
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• CSO issues credentials with correct district ID. If CSO issues creden-
tials with false district ID, CSO would be caught by the DSO when it
matches transaction data against smart meter readings for the district.
• A charging station typically has many sockets at a location. However,
here a single charging socket is denoted by the abbreviation CS. There
maybe many CSs close to each other and owned by the same CSO, but
they differ by the given CS Name and socket number, allowing EVUs to
differentiate between them. There are also visual indicators that show
CSO and ER branding, such that there is no confusion about which
charging station serves a particular ER and owned by which CSO.
• There exists secure channel of communication between the CSO, ER
and DSO such that they can securely transfer Transaction Logs.
3.3 Credential Generation
In the Ring Signature Design, each month the CSO collects the CS DIDs be-
longing to all the CSs in the district. Then CSO isses the same CS Credential
to each of the CSs. The subject of the credential is a set all the CS DIDs
and the District ID. This set of CS DIDs is used by the CSs as the signer set
for generating ring signatures. A verifier of the ring signature can be sure
that one of the DIDs in the set belongs to the signer but cannot figure out
which one. The CS Credential is valid for 1 month. The structure of the CS
Credential is detailed in Appendix A. The EV credential generation method
is the same as in the Multi-DID Design.
3.4 Exchange Messages and Presentations
The exchange messages used are the same as in Multi-DID Design but the
CS Presentation and Payment Commitment have been modified. The CS
Presentation is created by generating a ring signature on the EV DID received
from the EV. In the Multi-DID design, CS Presentation was discarded after
verification but in Ring Signature Design it is used to create the cs-signature
field of the Payment Commitment. The cs-signature consists of the EV
DID and ring signature obtained from the CS Presentation. In the Payment
Commitment of the Ring Signature Design the cs-did field is replaced with
the cs-signature field. Other fields in payment commitment are the same as
in the Multi-DID Design. The structure of the CS Presentation and Payment
Commitment is shown in Appendix A.
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3.5 Charging Transaction
The details of the charging transaction in the Ring Signature Design are
described here. The steps are indicated in Figure 3.1 and explained as follows:
1. Same as Multi-DID Design in Section 2.7.3.
2. Same as Multi-DID Design.
3. Same as Multi-DID Design.
4. Same as Multi-DID Design.
5. Same as Multi-DID Design.
6. Same as Multi-DID Design.
7. Same as Multi-DID Design.
8. The CS uses its long lived CS DID and CS Credential from
its wallet. CS also generates a CS Presentation by generating a ring
signature on the the EV DID with the other CSs in the district as ring
members.
9. Same as Multi-DID Design.
10. EV verifies the CS Credential and the CS Presentation. As the CS
Presentation contains only a ring signature, it proves that the presen-
tation creator is one of the CSs in the district without revealing the
exact CS. Then, EV generates the Payment Commitment. The hash
chain creation procedure is the same as in Multi-DID but the cs-did
field is replaced with cs-signature. cs-signature is the message and
signature acquired from the CS presentation in the previous step. The
Payment Commitment is then countersigned with private key associ-
ated with the EV DID.
11. Same as Multi-DID Design.
12. Same as Multi-DID Design.
13. Same as Multi-DID Design.
14. Same as Multi-DID Design.
15. Same as Multi-DID Design.
16. Same as Multi-DID Design.
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For i in
1..N
EVU EV CS
7. Exchange Request{ ECS_INV_KEY(EV DID) }
9. Exchange Response {
EEV_DID( CS DID, CS Credential, CS Presentation) }
10. Verify CS
Presentation (verify
ring signature) +
Generate Hashchain +
Create Payment
Commitment
8. Use long lived
CS DID
  + 
Generate CS
Presentation
(generate ring
signature)
1. Broadcast 
Service UUID, CS Name
11. Exchange Complete { 
ECS_DID( EV Credential, 
Payment Commitment{cs-signature, w0, n, p} ) } 12. Verify Payment
Commitment
Trust
Established
14 (a). Reveal next hash step, ECS_DID(w[i])
3. Exchange Invitation {CS_INV_KEY}
Check
hash
step
2. Connect
4. Show
Details
5. Confirm
13. Charging
Agreement
16. ACK
15. Terminate
Charging
6.
Choose
EV DID
14 (b). Release Microcharge
Figure 3.1: New Design using Ring Signature for reducing creation of one-
time use DIDs
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3.6 Payment Resolution
The collection and delivery of the Transaction Log of charging events is the
same as in the Multi-DID Design except that the Payment Commitment and
the CS credential are modified slightly as discussed earlier. Although CS and
EV know that CS DID is the true signer of the receipt, it is not apparent
from the ring signature itself, and the ER and DSO do not learn the CS DID
from the ring signature.
1. With the Transaction Log, EV Credential and CS Credential, the CSO
is able to:
(a) Identify the district the transaction happened from the CS Cre-
dential. The CSO knows the CS identity as well because it receives
the Transaction Log from the CS. However, this does not reveal
the EVU’s location to CSO as the EV DIDs are different in each
transaction and CSO does not know the real identity associated
with the EV DIDs.
(b) Identify the ER of which the EVU is a customer and thus demand
payment from the ER for the services rendered.
(c) Identify the amount of energy used for charging from the amount
of charge per step ‘p’ and the number of micropayments ‘k’.
(d) Identify the time of the transaction from the timestamp in the
Payment Commitment.
2. Similarly, with the Transaction Log, EV Credential and CS Credential,
the ER is able to:
(a) Identify only the district the transaction happened from the CS
Credential. This is because the ring signature in the CS Presen-
tation does not reveal the CS DID used in the transaction.
(b) Identify the CSO whose CS provided the charging service and thus
make payments to that CSO appropriately.
(c) Identify the amount of energy used for charging from the amount
of charge per step ‘p’ and the number of micropayments ‘k’.
(d) Identify the EVU who made use of the charging service from the
EV DID in the EV Credential and appropriately bill them.
(e) Identify the time of the transaction from the timestamp in the
Payment Commitment.
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3. And finally, with the Transaction Log, EV Credential and CS Creden-
tial, the DSO is able to:
(a) Identify only the district the transaction happened from the CS
Credential. This is because the ring signature in the CS Presen-
tation does not reveal the CS DID used in the transaction.
(b) Identify the ER involved in the transaction from the EV Credential
and reward the ER appropriately.
(c) Identify the amount of energy used for charging from the amount
of charge per step ‘p’ and the number of micropayments ‘k’. The
DSO sums the total energy used per district and decides the degree
of the ER’s contribution to grid balancing.
(d) Identify the time of the transaction from the timestamp in the
Payment Commitment.
3.7 Limitations
The level of privacy provided by both the Multi-DID and Ring Signature De-
sign depends on the size of the districts and the number of charging stations
located in that district. If the district is either geographically too small or
has very few CSs located in it, the EVU’s location may get compromised.
While in the Multi-DID Design, a new CS DID could be used right after
issuing a credential to the CS, in Ring Signature Design, updating a long lived
CS DID would require issuing new credential not only to that CS, but to all
the CSs in the district. However, updating a single CS DID is an unlikely
event as all CS DIDs are updated regularly, and therefore this limitation does
not cause any major problems.
A collusion between CSO and ER for monetary gains could be a risk.
It has been assumed that there is no collusion between the two but in the
real world collusion might happen. The CSO knows the EV DIDs and real
identities of CS involved in the charging event and the ER knows the EVUs
associated with the EV DIDs. By combining their information the ER and
CSO can reveal EVU’s location. Another possible threat is that a CS can
use non random values for ring signatures and thus undermine the anonymity
of the ring signature. However, such ring signatures can be detected by a
vigilant EV and the CSO could lose its reputation or face legal action.
Finally, correlation attacks may be possible using other data relating to
the use of services. For example, some information may be leaked from
network identifiers when the EV acquires the credentials via mobile network
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used to access the internet. Other information such as the type and model
of the vehicle and the characteristics of the battery system in the EV could
also be used to identify the EVU.
Chapter 4
Implementation
This section describes the implementation details for the prototypes of EV
and CS developed in the thesis. Firstly, it presents the devices used and
their capabilities. Then, it shows the properties of Bluetooth Low Energy
specific to Android. Next, it shows architecture details for the two proto-
types. Finally, it provides an overview of the software and libraries used for
the development.
4.1 Devices
The devices used for the implementation were two Android smartphones —
Nokia 8.1 and Nokia 6.1. Both Multi-DID and Ring Signature Designs as-
sume that the EV and CS are capable of performing public key cryptography.
Since modern smartphones are quite powerful, they were expected to perform
the cryptographic operations easily.
Another advantage of using smartphones is that they have number of
communication options. According to the designs, the devices should be
able to access the internet to connect to the ledger and acquire credentials
from the ER or CS, although the devices do not need internet connection
while charging. Furthermore, they should be able to communicate directly
with each other through a secure wireless channel as well. Among the op-
tions were Near Field Communication (NFC), Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)
and WiFi Direct. Bluetooth Low Energy was chosen as the communication
channel as BLE provides low energy consumption and sufficient range. The
implementation uses the latest Bluetooth version 5 which supports faster
data rates and longer range [17].
The experiments are conducted with the Nokia 6.1 representing EV and
Nokia 8.1 representing CS in the charging transaction. Distance between the
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phones is 1 metre which is a reasonable assumption of distance between EV
and CS. The device information and Bluetooth Low Energy configuration of
the phones is shown in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Device information and Bluetooth Low Energy configuration for
the test phones as shown by the NRF Connect Application [3]
4.2 Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) in Android
Bluetooth Low Energy version 5 [17] has many features, such as faster phys-
ical channel which theoretically doubles the transmission speed compared to
BLE version 4, longer range, and error correction codes. However, the actual
BLE performance depends on various other connection parameters such as
Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU), connection interval, packets sent per
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connection interval, write mode, etc. BLE in Android supports a Maximum
Transmission Unit (MTU) length of 517 bytes which the maximum length
of a single packet. The connection interval for a high priority connection
in Android is 7.5 ms and up to 4 packets can sent per connection interval.
After connection establishment Android allows negotiation of the connection
parameters.
BLE devices mainly have two profiles: ‘peripheral’ which broadcasts and
provides the service, and ‘client’ which may scan and connect to the pe-
ripheral. Data in a BLE peripheral resides in characteristics which are fixed
length memory spaces from which data can read and written to. After con-
necting with a peripheral, the client must perform service discovery which
reveals all the characteristics on peripheral. A client may request the periph-
eral to send update notifications for a specific characteristic [41]. The time
to discover a peripheral and perform service discovery depends on the scan
mode and pairing state of the devices. For the measurements, the devices
are kept in unpaired state to simulate the case when an EV uses a new CS.
Pairing state has an impact on transaction time as already paired device use
a cached list to discover services and therefore connection establishment is
much faster.
Charging stations are connected to the electric vehicles via cables and
therefore could use a wired communication protocol. However, this imple-
mentation was done with BLE to incorporate future cases such as wireless
charging [33]. Another benefit of using BLE is that the charging protocol
can begin already as the EV is approaching the CS. BLE on Android how-
ever has a limitation that the permission to access location services must be
granted to an application using BLE and therefore the user has to trust the
application to not misuse location data.
Messages longer than the MTU are required to be in packets in BLE.
Furthermore, BLE operations in Android are required to be performed seri-
ally as otherwise the newer operation overrides the older operation. Thus,
applications using BLE need to implement message buffers for sending long
messages and operation queues for serialising operations [59]. The structure
of EV and CS buffers and operation queue is shown in Figure 4.2. The imple-
mentation uses three characteristics to communicate the messages between
the devices: Rx which receives the messages from the EV, Tx which sends
information to the EV via notifications and ‘stage’ which is used to synchro-
nise the progress of the protocol between the 2 devices. In the EV, all BLE
operations are first put in operation queue and then serially executed. The
write operation divides the message into packets of size equal to the MTU
and stores them in the write buffer. The packets are then read from the write
buffer and sent serially. For read operations, packets received from the CS
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are queued to the read buffer until a message with a end of message indicator
is received upon which all packets are combined to recreate the full message.
A similar process is followed by the CS as well.
write message
BLE
Peripheral
(CS)
BLE
Client
(EV)
Rx
Tx
Stage
Operation
Queue
notification
Write
Buffer
Read
Buffer
write stage
Read
Buffer
Write
Buffer
getMessage
localWrite
sendMessage
getMessage
Figure 4.2: Structure of the EV and CS applications showing message buffers,
operation queue and characteristics
4.3 System Architecture
The implementation focused on the interaction between the EV and CS dur-
ing the charging transaction and the rest of the interactions such as EVU reg-
istration with ER and CS on-boarding to CSO is assumed to have happened
beforehand. The process of acquiring credentials is simulated by generating
the credentials on the device. The design of the EV and CS application is
described next and their flow diagram is shown in Figure 4.3.
The EV application on being started, initialises the libraries and generates
EV credential. Then, the EV scans for nearby BLE services with the target
service UUID. Once the target CS is found, it negotiates the BLE connection
parameters such as MTU, discovers services and enables notifications on the
stage characteristics. Next, the protocol begins which involves exchange of
DIDs, credentials and presentations. The EV also performs various crypto-
graphic operations such as signature generation and verification, encryption
and decryption, hashing etc. If the mutual authentication succeeds, the EV
application proceeds charging with by sending micropayments. At each it-
eration the EV sends the next hash chain step and waits for the the charge
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(which is simulated with a notification update from the CS). The protocol
finishes when all hash chain steps have been revealed or if terminated by the
user. Similarly, CS also initialises the library and generates CS Credentials
on the device. It then broadcasts the service UUID. The charging protocol
starts after the discovery and connection creation process as explained be-
fore. The CS verifies the EV Credentials and Payment Commitment and
on successful verification, the micropayments are received and corresponding
notification (representing release a charge) is sent. The code for the imple-
mentation is available in its GitHub repository [11] and the user interface of
the applications is shown in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.3: Flow diagram of Electric Vehicle (EV) and Charging Station (CS)
applications
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Figure 4.4: User interface of the applications: Electric Vehicle (EV) and
Charging Station (CS)
4.4 Software Overview
An overview of the software used such as SDKs, IDEs and libraries have been
described here.
4.4.1 Android SDK and Development Environment
Android Studio 4.0.1 was used as the development environment. Android
Studio provides various useful features such as visual graphics designer and
code completion. Both the EV and CS applications used Android SDK
version 28.0.3 for compilation along with Gradle version 3.5.3 for dependency
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management.
4.4.2 Kyber Crypto Library
Various cryptographic libraries are available in Android such as Libsodium [23]
and Lazysodium [61]. Although these libraries have Ed22519 cryptography
functions, none of them had ready to use ring signature implementation.
Implementing our own ring signature library would have reduced confidence
in the results. Thus, ring signature implementation in the Kyber crypto
library [21] which is written in Golang, was used for this thesis.
Kyber crypto library from the Dedis group is managed by programmers
from EPFL and Yale. It has been extensively tested from timing and message
length attacks. Most importantly it has a ready to use implementation for
ring signatures with Ed25519.
As Kyber is written in Golang, cross language bindings were required
to integrate into Android. Gomobile [18] was used to generate bindings of
Kyber for java. Gomobile generates an Android library file .AAR which can
simply be imported to the main application. However, calling cross language
functions have some processing overhead which might have increased the
timing measurements.
4.4.3 Hyperledger Indy SDK for Android
Hyperledger Indy SDK is available as library C-callable library. In Android,
it can used via JNI integration. Hyperledger Indy provide a complete suite
of functions for identifier management such as DID creation, wallets, con-
nection to ledgers and cryptographic primitives like encryption, decryption,
and signing.
Chapter 5
Results
This section presents the results from the measurements with the prototype
implementations. Firstly, it details the test assumptions based on real data
from Norway such as the number of EVs, CSs, districts and charging trans-
actions. Secondly, the performance and scalability of ring signatures was
compared with regular signatures. Then, the Multi-DID Design and the
Ring Signature Design performance are compared on four fronts: identifier
creation, credential generation, charging transaction, and billing evidence.
5.1 Test Assumptions
The fleet of electric vehicles in Norway is the largest per capita in the
world [48] and their popularity has also led to a highly developed EV charg-
ing infrastructure in the country. Thus, Norway was chosen as the model for
the test assumptions in this thesis. According to the Norwegian Charging
Station Database, NOBIL [39], as of July 2020, Norway has 12,938 regular
charging points and 2,539 fast charging points, for a total of 15,477 publicly
available charging points. Additionally, at the start of 2020, Norway had
260,692 registered battery electric or plugin hybrid vehicles [57].
According to the survey by the Norwegian EV Association [22], EV own-
ers, who live in smaller houses, often do not have their own garages or des-
ignated parking spaces and therefore are more likely to charge their EVs at
public CSs. The highest percentage of public charging station users, 28%,
are users living in apartment buildings—they claim to charge their EVs daily
or weekly at public charging stations.
Based on the survey data, and taking a conservative approximation, the
calculations in this thesis are done under the assumption that all the EVs
in the country are being used regularly and 28% of these EVs are charged
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daily at public CSs. Thus, assuming charging station usage is spread evenly
throughout the country, each CS was calculated to performs 5 charging trans-
actions per day. According to Statistics Norway [64], Norway has 356 mu-
nicipalities and the test environment was assumed to have the same number
of energy districts, although in reality these districts are created by the DSO
and may be different from municipal districts. Although the number of charg-
ing stations is greater in the southern region of Norway, it was assumed that
there are the same number of charging stations in each district. The number
of CSs per district was calculated to be 44 and rounded up to 50 for the
calculations. Therefore, the ring size of the set created by the CSs in each
district is also 50. The assumptions have been summarised in Table 5.1.
Entity Count
Total EVs 260 692
Total CSs 15 477
Number of districts 356
CSs per district 50
Ring Size 50
Charging transactions
(per CS per day)
5
Table 5.1: Number of EVs, CSs, districts and transactions used in calcula-
tions in this thesis
5.2 Ring Signatures
A key factor affecting the performance of ring signatures is the ring size,
which is defined as the number of members in the anonymity set of the
ring signature. As the ring size increases, more resources are required for
signature generation as the signature value must be valid for each public key
in the anonymity set and similarly, signature verification also requires more
resources as the signature must be verified against each of the public keys in
the anonymity set. The signature length also increases with ring size because
it contains the contribution value for each of the signers in the anonymity
set.
A type of Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA), Ed25519,
which combines the Curve25519 and SHA-512 hashing algorithm, was used
for regular signatures in this thesis. The implementation is provided by the
Kyber crypto library. A signature with this algorithm is 64 bytes long and
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it takes 0.875 ms for generation and 1.06 ms for verification of signature
on 32 kilobytes of data on the Nokia 8.1 test device. The results are in
agreement with expectation as it is known that verification is a bit slower
than generation in EdDSA [1].
The measurement for ring signatures was also done using the same Ed-
DSA algorithm implemented in the Kyber crypto library although it uses
a slightly faster Blake 2xb [28] hashing algorithm. However, this difference
should have negligible effect on the results as the hashing operation (SHA-
512) is more than 100 times faster than signing and more than 300 times
faster than verification with Ed25519 [27]. A measurement of ring signature
performance with respect to changing ring size was executed on the same de-
vice (Nokia 8.1) and the results are shown in Table 5.2. The measurements
start from ring size of 1 for completeness, but such a ring size is unlikely to
have any application. The length of the ring signature increases linearly with
growing ring size throughout the range. The signature length for the ring
size of 50 is about 1.6 kilobytes (KB). However, ring signature length of ring
size larger than 200 becomes quite large. At ring size of 1,000 members, the
signature length grows to 32 KB which is the same size as the data signed.
Ring Size 1 2 5 10 20 50 100 200 500 1 000 2 000 5 000 10 000
Signing (ms) 0.423 1.26 3.09 6.39 13.3 33.3 66.9 134 335 670 1 340 3 410 7 140
Verification (ms) 0.785 2.01 3.46 6.76 13.3 33.1 66.4 132 331 659 1 320 3 366 6 670
Signature Length (bytes) 64 96 192 352 672 1 632 3 232 6 432 16 K 32 K 64 K 160 K 320 K
Table 5.2: Effect of ring size on signature generation time, verification time
and signature length.
Based on the Table 5.2, the relationship of ring signature generation and
verification times with ring size is shown in Figure 5.1. The figure shows
that the signature generation time and signature verification time increase
linearly with increasing ring size for the majority of the range. The signature
verification time is greater than generation time for ring sizes smaller than 20,
but for larger ring sizes the verification time decreases slightly and becomes
almost the same as the signature generation time. This is in contrast with
regular elliptic curves signatures, which usually have verification time larger
than signature generation time [1].
On the whole, the signature generation and verification times are roughly
the same as both involve almost the same mathematical operations except
for one inversion operation on the signer’s trapdoor permutation during sig-
nature generation. Even for very large rings of size 10,000 members, the time
for ring signature generation and verification keeps growing linearly. How-
ever, the time grows to several seconds which would significantly degrade the
user experience. For ring size of 50 members, which is also the ring size of
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CSs in a district in the thesis, a signature can be generated or verified in
about 34 ms. Thus, having negligible effect on the user experience.
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Figure 5.1: Ring Signature generation and verification time with respect to
ring size
The findings show that ring signatures are scalable operations and easily
support large ring sizes of more than 1,000 keys. Ring Signatures are compu-
tationally inexpensive operations as signing and verification operations for a
ring size of even 1,000 members can be done in well under a second. However,
storage and transmission of ring signatures might become challenging for big-
ger ring size as signature length increases and consume significant memory
resources. Thus, ring signatures with moderate ring sizes of up to 100 keys
are suitable for use on modern mobile devices.
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5.3 Identifiers
Two different types of DIDs are used in the both the Multi-DID and Ring
Signature Designs — Public DIDs and Peer DIDs. The generation time and
storage requirement for the peer and public DIDs are the same as both are
derived from a public-private key pair. An Ed25519 key pair consists of a
32 byte public key and a 32 byte private key, thus making a total storage
requirement of 64 bytes [52]. The average time require to create a peer DID is
0.287 ms on the Nokia 8.1 device. The major component of the DID creation
is the creation of the elliptic curve key pair. Creation of public DID also
involves writing the associated keys in the ledger but they can be written
before the protocol starts and therefore ledger operations do not affect the
EV charging performance.
Since the public DIDs are pre-generated and the peer DID usage by EV
is same in both designs, only peer DID usage by the CS was measured.
Table 5.3 shows the comparison of computation performance on the Nokia
8.1 device and the memory required for CS DID in the Multi-DID and the
Ring Signature Design.
Conditions Multi-DID Ring Signature
Period: 1 Day
Districts: 1
CSs: 1
Transactions: 5
DIDs: 5
Time: 1.43 ms
Size: 320 B
DIDs: 1
Time: 0.287 ms
Size: 64 B
Period: 1 Month
Districts: 1
CSs: 50
Transactions: 7500
DIDs: 7 500
Time: 2.1 s
Size: 480 KB
DIDs: 50
Time: 14 ms
Size: 3.2 KB
Period: 1 Month
Districts: 356
CSs: 15 477
Transactions: 2 321 550
DIDs: 2 321 550
Time: 11 min
Size: 150 MB
DIDs: 15 477
Time: 4.4 s
Size: 0.99 MB
Table 5.3: Comparison of peer DID usage in CSs — per CS per day, in a
district per month, and for the whole country per month. The number of
DIDs generated, their generation time and the size of storage required are
shown for each condition.
Firstly, the peer DID usage by a single CS in a typical day is presented.
Based on the assumptions, A CS performs, on average, 5 transactions. In
the Multi-DID Design, 5 DIDs are created per day and need to be stored on
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the CS device. On the other hand, Ring Signature Design requires creation
of only 1 DID. The storage and computation requirements are low in both
designs.
Next, the number of DIDs created and associated performance in the
time period of a month in a district with 50 CSs is shown. In the course of
a month, 7,500 charging transaction take place at different CSs in a district.
In the Multi-DID design, the 7,500 DIDs need to be generated compared to
just 50 in the Ring Signature Design. These DIDs need to be stored by ER,
DSO and CSO as part of payment commitment in the Multi-DID design.
Finally, DID requirements for all districts in the country in the course
of a month are shown. In 356 districts, 2,321,550 transaction occur and the
same number of DIDs are generated in the Multi-DID Design. In contrast,
Ring Signature Design requires creation of just 15,477 DIDs which require
150 times less storage than the other design. Still, the storage requirements
are low as well as the DID generation time for both the designs. A CSO with
the computing power of a server could perform these operations even faster.
Thus, peer DIDs are suitable for use even in large numbers.
5.4 Credentials
Two types of credentials are used in the Multi-DID and Ring Signature De-
sign — EV credential and CS credential. The properties, creation time and
storage requirement of these credentials have been summarised in Table 5.4.
Property
EV Credential
(Same in both designs)
CS Credential
(Multi-DID Design)
CS Credential, Ring Size = 50
(Ring Signature Design)
Attribute 1 EV DID 1 CS DID, District ID Set of 50 CS DIDs, District ID
Validity 5 days 3 days 1 month
Usage 1 transaction 1 transaction multiple transactions
Issuer ER CSO CSO
Creation Time (ms) 5 6 6
Size (bytes) 651 667 2987
Table 5.4: Overview of credentials issued to EV and CS before the charging
transaction for proving their authorisation to each other.
The EV credential is the same in both designs. The EV credential is issued
by the ER and is used to authorise the EV DID and thus allows the EV using
it to charge at specific CSs. It is acquired by the EV before the transaction
and is valid for 5 days. As EV DID is used just once per transaction, the
corresponding EV credential is also used for only 1 transaction.
The CS credential on the other hand, is different in the two designs. In
the Multi-DID design, the CS credential authorises the CS DID and also
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asserts the district ID of the CS. Once issued by the CSO, it is valid for 3
days but can be used only once. In the Ring Signature Design, CS credential
specifies a set of 50 CS DIDs belonging to the district along with the District
ID. This credential, in contrast, is valid for a month and can be reused.
On the Nokia 8.1 test device, EV credential took 5 ms to create while
taking 651 bytes to store. The creation of CS credential took 6 ms for both
the Multi-DID and Ring Signature although the size was different 667 bytes
and 2,987 bytes respectively. The creation time is the same despite different
size because the major time consuming process is signing which is dependant
on the fixed sized hash of the data to be signed.
Applying the above properties of credentials to the test assumptions, the
credential generation time and size requirement was determined for 1 CS per
day, for 1 district over a month and for all districts over a month as shown
in Table 5.5.
Conditions Multi-DID Ring Signature
Period: 1 Day
Districts: 1
CSs: 1
Transactions: 5
Credentials: 5
Time: 30 ms
Size: 3.3 KB
Credentials: 1
Time: 6 ms
Size: 2.9 KB
Period: 1 Month
Districts: 1
CSs: 50
Transactions: 7500
Credentials: 7 500
Time: 45 s
Size: 5 MB
Credentials: 1
Time: 6 ms
Size: 3 KB
Period: 1 Month
Districts: 356
CSs: 15 477
Transactions: 2 321 550
Credentials: 2 321 550
Time: 4 hrs
Size: 1.5 GB
Credentials: 356
Time: 2.1 s
Size: 1 MB
Table 5.5: CS Credentials generation per CS per day, per district per month
and all districts per month. The number of credentials generated, their
generation time and the size of storage required are shown for each condition.
Firstly, in the Multi-DID design, a single CS uses 5 credentials during
a typical day whereas in the Ring Signature Design, since credentials are
reused, only 1 credential is used. The credentials are stored on the CS device
and require around 3 KB of storage space in both designs. Secondly, the
number of credentials issued to CSs per district in the Multi-DID Design in-
creases to 7,500 when calculated over the course of a month while in the Ring
Signature Design, the number of credentials stay the same. Finally, when
comparing for all districts over a month, the difference is further multiplied
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with Multi-DID design using 1.5 GB of storage and 4 hours of computation
time compared to just 1 MB of storage and 2.1 seconds of computation time
by the Ring Signature Design.
For the billing purposes, the CS forwards the Transaction Logs to the CSO
at end of the month. The CSO stores all the CS credentials it has issued and
also sends them to the ER and DSO at the end of each month. Thus, CSO,
DSO and ER require similar storage space to store all CS credentials used
in the past month. In the Multi-DID design, 1.5 GB of storage is required
by each of them, while in Ring Signature Design, just 1 MB of storage is
required.
Thus, Ring Signature Design leads to a massive saving in credentials stor-
age and computation requirement. It leads to 7000 times less computation
time and 1500 times less storage requirement. Although the requirements
for the Multi-DID can be easily met with modern computing hardware, Ring
Signature Design is still far more efficient.
5.5 Charging Transaction
This section presents the performance measurements of the charging trans-
action and compares the Multi-DID and Ring Signature Design. First, the
test methods and conditions have been defined. Next, a performance mea-
surement of the charging transaction from the perspective of the EV is pre-
sented by calculating both the time spent in Bluetooth transmission and
in cryptographic operations. Finally, a detailed measurement of time spent
per cryptographic operations has been shown to identify the most expensive
operations.
The prototype implementations of EV and CS was run on the Nokia 6.1
device and Nokia 8.1 device respectively. Measurements were taken for the
Bluetooth connection establishment, time spent in transmission of messages
and the time spent in computation as shown in 5.6. The respective DIDs
and credentials were already generated before the transaction. The CS is
activated first so that it advertises its BLE peripheral service. The message
transmission and reception time was calculated from the EV while the com-
putation time was calculated at both the EV and CS. The test was repeated
5 times and then average values were taken. The EV and CS devices were
set 1 metre apart.
The Bluetooth connection establishment took 1,814 ms with majority
of the time spent in connection established after finding the CS and while
discovering services. The Bluetooth connection establishment makes the bulk
of the whole transaction time.
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Event / Message
Size
(bytes)
Transfer time
(ms)
Computation time
(ms)
Combined time
(ms)
Connection establishment 1814
Find CS BLE peripheral 128
Establish connection 874
Discover services 764
Enable notifcations 33
Request MTU 15
Charging protocol (Multi-DID) 3465 225 162 386
Receive Exchange Invitation 166 82 3 85
Send Exchange Request 254 2 43 45
Receive Exchange Response 1535 129 52 181
Write Exchange Complete 1510 12 63 75
Charging protocol (Ring Signature) 10855 263 330 593
Receive Exchange Invitation 166 89 5 94
Send Exchange Request 254 2 46 48
Receive Exchange Response 6749 146 222 368
Write Exchange Complete 3686 26 57 83
Total (Connection + Multi-DID) 2200
Total (Connection + Ring Signature) 2407
Table 5.6: Comparison of EV charging event for the Multi-DID and Ring
Signature Design from the perspective of EV
Compared to the Multi-DID implementation, the Ring Signature imple-
mentation transferred 3 times as much data. The time spent in data transfer
was however only slightly more as the BLE throughput increases for longer
messages. About double the amount of time was spent doing cryptographic
operations such as signing presentations and encrypting messages. Overall,
the Ring Signature implementation took 9.4% (207 ms) more time for the
whole transaction. Thus in practice, Ring Signature implementation is as
fast as the Multi-DID implementation.
Figure 5.2 shows the operations performed and the time taken for each
message in the charging protocol in the Multi-DID and Ring Signature De-
sign. The labels — Req, Resp and Cmt, refer to the messages Exchange
Request (introduced in Step 7 of Section 2.7.2), Exchange Response (Step 9)
and Exchange Complete (Step 11) respectively. The value for hash opera-
tion in the figure shows only the hashing operations performed as part of the
micro transaction setup. Other operations such as signature generation and
verification internally perform hashing operations as well but they have not
been counted separately. Overall, the time spent in cryptography is larger
in the Ring Signature Design for both the EV and the CS with the major
increase due to ring signature generation in CS and its verification by the
EV. The addition of ring signatures increases the size of the messages but it
does not significantly increase the encryption and decryption times and they
stay roughly the same.
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Figure 5.2: Time taken by cryptographic operations during charging trans-
action in the Multi-DID and Ring Signature Design
5.6 Payment Resolution
This section presents the difference between the storage and processing re-
quirements of the CSO, ER and DSO for identifying and verifying the entities
related to a payment relationship for both the Multi-DID and Ring Signa-
ture Design. Firstly, the Transaction Log is defined which is the package of
information sent along with credentials to identify and authenticate transac-
tion events. Then, the storage requirements per transactions are shown and
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requirements for all transactions are interpolated. Finally, the processing
required to verify a single transaction is presented and total requirement for
all transactions is calculated.
The overview of Transaction Logs in the Multi-DID and Ring Signature
Design is presented in Table 5.7. Transaction Log consists of payment com-
mitment, last hash chain step and step number. The major cause of the
difference in size of Transaction Logs in the two designs is the large size of
ring signature created by the CS included in the payment commitment. This
makes a Transaction Log of the Ring Signature Design more than 5 times as
large as a Multi-DID Transaction Log.
Entity Size (Multi-DID) Size (Ring Sign)
Payment commitment 438 2627
Last hash chain 44 44
Step number 2 2
Total 484 2673
Table 5.7: Details of Transaction Logs and their size (bytes)
The Table 5.8 shows the collection of billing evidence stored by the CSO,
ER and DSO for payment resolution in the 2 designs per transaction. In the
table, the storage requirement is shown for 1 Transaction Log and associated
credentials.
Although only one CS credential is enough to support all the transactions
for the month in a district, individual Transaction Logs are much larger in
the Ring Signature Design as compared to Multi-DID design, and the total
space required is larger. Supposing n is the number of transactions and d
is the number of districts, storage required by the CSO for the Transaction
Log and credentials can be calculated. In case of Multi-DID,
storage = (Log + EV Cred + CSCred) · n
or
storage = (1802) · n
On the other hand, in Ring Signature Design,
storage = (Log + EV Cred) · n + (CSCred) · d
or
storage = (3324) · n + (2987) · d
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From the above 2 equations, it can be deduced that storage requirement
for Ring Signature Design is larger for any number of transactions. For in-
stance, in a district with 50 CSs and 7,500 transactions, Multi-DID Design
has a storage requirement of 13.5 MB whereas Ring Signature has a stor-
age requirement of 25 MB. For all districts with 356 districts and 2,321,550
transactions, the storage requirement is 4.2 GB and 7.7 GB respectively. For
very large number of transactions, Ring Signature storage requirement is 1.8
times that of Multi-DID Design.
Multi-DID Design
Verifier Received Size (bytes) Has Size (bytes) Total (bytes)
CSO Log + EV Cred 1135 CS Cred 667 1802
ER Log + CS Cred 1151 EV Cred 651 1802
DSO Log + EV Cred + CS Cred 1802 - 0 1802
Ring Signature Design
Verifier Received Size (bytes) Has Size (bytes) Total (bytes)
CSO Log + EV Cred 3324 CS Cred 2987 6311
ER Log + CS Cred 5660 EV Cred 651 6311
DSO Log + EV Cred + CS Cred 6311 - 0 6311
Table 5.8: Billing evidence collection and storage by CSO, ER, and DSO for
payment resolution per transaction
The Table 5.9 shows the cryptographic operations performed by the CSO,
ER and DSO for payment resolution in the two designs per transaction. The
verification time of a Ring Signature Transaction Log is much longer than a
Multi-DID due to the large time take by the ring signature verification.
Taking a similar approach as before with storage requirement, time re-
quired to verify n transactions in d districts by the CSO can be calculated
as :
In case of Multi-DID,
time = (EV Cred + EV Sign) · n
or
time = (9) · n
On the other hand, in Ring Signature Design,
time = (EV Cred + EV Sign + CSRingSign) · n
or
time = (82) · n
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In other words, Ring Signature Transaction Log verification takes 9 times
as much time as in Multi-DID Design. For all districts with 2,321,550 trans-
actions it takes 5 hrs 48 min for Multi-DID whereas it takes 52 hrs 54 min.
Multi-DID Design
Verifier EV Cred EV Sign CS Cred Total Time (ms)
CSO 7 2 - 9
ER - 2 10 12
DSO 7 2 10 19
Ring Signature Design
Verifier EV Cred EV Sign CS Cred CS R. Sign Total Time (ms)
CSO 7 5 - 70 82
ER - 5 10 70 85
DSO 7 5 10 70 92
Table 5.9: Computation time (ms) for verification of the EV Credential,
CS Credential, EV’s signatures on Payment Commitment, and CS’s ring
signatures on CS Presentation as performed by CSO, ER, and DSO while
performing payment resolution
Therefore, although quantity of CS credentials are reduced in the Ring
Signature Design, the total storage requirement is almost double the baseline
requirement. This is mainly due to large size of the ring signature. Since
smaller ring size leads to smaller signatures, smaller districts should be pre-
ferred. The performance degradation in transaction verification is worse —
taking 9 times as much time.
Chapter 6
Discussion
This section analyses the results from the previous section and answers the
research questions of this thesis.
RQ1: How should the charging events be logged and signed with
Ring Signatures without revealing personal information of the
user and yet prove the authenticity of the charging transaction
to the CSO, ER, and DSO?
Each charging event leads to the creation of a Transaction Log. The
Transaction Log consists of a Payment Commitment, last hash chain step
and the step number as discussed in Section 3.6. The Payment Commitment
is signed by the EV using an EV DID which is unique per transaction. The
Payment Commitment also contains the ring signature by the CS using its
long lived CS DID. Additionally, the CS collects the EV Credential sent by
the EV to authenticate the EV DID.
The Transaction Log is shared with the CSO, ER, and DSO, and they
verify the logs according to their purposes as detailed in 3.6. Firstly, the CS
sends the Transaction Logs to the CSO. The CSO needs to identify which
ER is associated with the transaction. The CSO verifies the signature on the
Payment Commitment by the EV and the EV Credential which proves that
EV DID used was authorised by the ER and the owner of the EV DID has
created the Payment Commitment. Since the EV DID and EV Credential
are different for every transaction, the CSO cannot correlate the EV identity
over time and thus, the EVU’s location privacy remains protected. The CSO
also verifies the ring signature in the Payment Commitment which proves
that the charging event happened at a valid CSs using the CS Credential
which earlier had been issued to CSs and is also kept stored by the CSO.
Thus, the CSO can reliably claim payment from the ER for providing the
charging service without knowing the identity of the EVU.
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At the end of the month, the CSO sends the Transaction Logs along
with the CS credentials to the ER. The ER verifies the ring signature in the
Payment Commitment of each transaction and the CS credential for each
district. If the ring signature is valid for the anonymity set provided by the
CS credential then it proves that the charging event happened at a CS owned
by the CSO and in the district mentioned in the CS credential. Verification
of the signature by the EV DID on the Payment Commitment proves that a
valid customer of the ER authorised the transaction. The ER is able to bill
the correct EVU as the real identity associated with an EV DID is known
to the ER. However, the ER cannot figure out the exact CS involved in the
transaction from neither the ring signature nor the CS credential. Therefore
ER is unaware of the exact location of the EVU at the time of charging.
Finally, the ER sends the Transaction Log along with both the EV and
CS Credentials to the DSO. Following a similar process, the DSO verifies
the signature made by the EV on the Payment Commitment and the EV
Credential proving that an authorised ER customer charged its EV. The
DSO then verifies the ring signature and the CS Credential, which proves
that the charging event took place at a valid CS and in the district mentioned
in the CS Credential. With this information, the DSO is able to access the
extent of ER’s contribution in grid balancing per district and rewards it
accordingly. However, the DSO neither knows the real identity of EVUs
associated with the EV DID nor does it know the identity of the CS involved
in the transaction from the ring signature. Hence, all three service providing
entities, the CSO, ER, and DSO are assured that the transactions are valid
and happened at specified districts without knowing the exact location of
the EVUs.
RQ2: How does the use of Ring Signatures along with Decentral-
ized Identifiers, as opposed to using just Decentralized Identifiers,
affect the protection of privacy for EVUs in the use case?
In the Multi-DID design, the CS DID is present in the Transaction Logs
and therefore, it is known by the CSO, ER and DSO as shown in Section 2.7.4.
As the CS DIDs are unique per transaction, the ER and the DSO cannot
correlate CS identity. On the other hand, in Ring Signature Design, a ring
signature is present in the Payment Commitment and the ER and DSO do
not know the CS DID used for the transaction. Although, the CSO may
infer the CS DID used from by checking the source of the Transaction Log, it
cannot prove this to another party. The location privacy of the EVU depends
on the fact that the identity of the CS used for charging is kept hidden. In
both designs, the CSO knows the relationship between the CS DID and the
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location of the CS using it.
One clear difference, therefore, in the Ring Signature Design, is that
the CSO does not know the exact CS involved in the transaction. In the
Multi-DID design, as the identity and location of a CS using particular CS
DID is known to the CSO, it could reveal this information along with the
associated EV DID to others, thus exposing EVU’s location at the time of
the charging event. Therefore, the Ring Signature Design is slightly more
privacy protecting for the EVU.
In contrast, the CSO, ER and DSO in both designs, know the EV DID
from the Transaction Log. The CSO and DSO cannot correlate EVU’s iden-
tity as the EV DIDs are unique per transaction. Only the ER can identify
transaction belonging to a EVU as it knows the EVU’s identity associated
with each EV DID.
However, the ER cannot figure out the exact EVU location from the
Transaction Logs in either of the designs. In the Multi-DID Design, the CS
DID is used only once per transaction which made correlation impossible
if random DIDs are chosen by the CS. In the Ring Signature Design, the
ring signature along with the CS credential proves that the CS involved in
the transaction is one of the CSs in the district. Correlation from the ring
signature itself is hard as each instance of the signature is generated on a
fresh message. Thus, in both designs, the EVU’s location is known only to
the accuracy of the district and the same level of privacy is provided to the
EVU.
RQ3: What is the effect of using Ring Signatures on the resource
consumption and the transaction time of the system in the use
case?
Ring Signatures, on their own, are more resource intensive than simple
signatures. The ring signatures resource consumption varies with the number
of possible signers in the anonymity set. According to Section 5.2, for a
ring size of 50, a ring signature is about 35 times slower for generation and
verification, and the size of the ring signature is about 250 times larger (1.6
kilobytes) compared regular signatures (64 bytes).
As shown in Section 5.3, in the Ring Signature Design, fewer CS DIDs are
required to be generated and stored. Only one CS DID is required per CS
per month as compared to new CS DIDs for each transaction in the Multi-
DID Design. Thus, for all districts, 150 times less storage and processing
resources are required. Fewer number of CS DIDs also lead to creation of
fewer number of credentials by the CSO. Although in Ring Signature Design
CS credential is much larger (2988 B), far less number of credential are
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required. Monthly storage requirement for all credentials in the 356 districts
is about 1 MB compared to 1.5 GB for the Multi-DID Design. Therefore,
when comparing resource consumption for just the DIDs and credentials,
Ring Signature Design performs better.
However, for the Transaction Logs, the situation is different. The Ring
Signature Design creates much larger Transaction Logs, primarily due to
the bigger size of the ring signature. From Section 5.4 and Section 5.6, in
the Ring Signature Design, the CSO requires 3.5 GB of more storage space
for the Transaction Logs created in a month for all districts. Subtracting
the storage improvement for the credential storage (1.5 GB) for the same
period, the overall storage requirement in Ring Signature Design is 2 GB
(total 7.7 GB) more than the Multi-DID design.
The payments resolution which involves verification of the signatures in
the presentation and credentials is much slower in the Ring Signature Design.
As seen in Section 5.6, charging transaction verification for all district in a
period of one month requires 53 hours compared to 6 hours on the test
hardware. Although this computation is not too challenging to compute for
a server, the Ring Signature Design does perform significantly worse, taking
9 times the computation power as the Multi-DID Design.
The total transaction time of charging event for the Ring Signature Design
is 2,407 ms compared to 2,200ms for the Multi-DID Design. Out of the total,
1,814 ms is used in establishing the Bluetooth connection and the rest of the
593 ms for the creation of presentations and exchanging credentials across
EV and CS. Since the time difference is between the designs is just 207 ms
(9.4%), it does not significantly affect the user experience.
RQ4: What effect do Ring Signatures have on the deployability
of the system on constrained devices?
The main factors affecting the deployability of a system on constrained
devices are computation, power consumption, storage, and communication.
Public key cryptography is resource consuming and not all constrained de-
vices are able to perform them. Therefore low computation requirement is
extremely important. As seen in Section 5.2 and Section 5.3, ring signature
consume more resource in both signature generation and their storage than
creating new DIDs for each transaction. Ring signatures also require more
computation for verification as compared to regular signatures. As seen in
Section 5.5, without the Bluetooth overhead, the computation time is signif-
icantly larger with ring signatures while performing a single transaction on
sufficiently capable devices.
Power consumption may become a concern as ring signatures are rela-
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tively more complex operations. As seen in Section 5.6, about 70 ms is spent
in a single ring signature verification as opposed to just 5 ms for regular
signatures. Thus, power constrained devices may exhaust way faster while
using ring signatures.
Using the equations in Section 5.6, the on-device storage for a CS in
the Ring Signature Design can be calculated to be 19,607 bytes compared
to 9,010 bytes for the Multi-DID Design. Thus, constrained devices imple-
menting ring signatures need to have bigger memory space. For processing
bulk transactions, the servers supporting the constrained devices also require
about double the storage space.
More data needs to be communicated when using ring signatures as the
larger size of the signature leads to longer messages. As seen in Section 5.5,
the transmission of longer messages have little effect on the total transaction
time because the encryption and decryption operations and the Bluetooth
transfer speeds are relatively quite fast.
Therefore, ring signatures may be deployed on constrained devices when
certain conditions are met, such as sufficient power availability, enough hard-
ware capability to perform public key cryptography, and larger storage ca-
pacity. If the devices are resource constrained, then the Multi-DID Design is
most likely a better option.
RQ5: How do Ring Signatures affect the use of Decentralized
Identifiers on a broader scale?
As discussed in Research Question 2, ring signatures provide slightly bet-
ter privacy but it does end up consuming significantly more resources. In the
Ring Signature Design, the overall performance for a single transaction does
not degrade much but for bulk operations, such as transaction verification,
the difference is substantial. As a very similar level of privacy is provided by
the Multi-DID Design for far less resource consumption, using just DIDs is
suitable for most cases.
However, using ring signatures might be worth the extra effort in cer-
tain situations. Ring signatures might be used in situations which have risks
involved of an entity revealing the real identity behind a DID (such as a
dishonest CSO). Alternatively, it could be the situation where DIDs are long
term identifiers of the entity and ring signatures facilitate the creation of un-
traceable Transaction Logs without the need to change the DIDs frequently.
Thus, its applicability goes beyond situations such as fixed location services.
Ring signatures can be used by not only the services but users as well e.g.
they can be used in systems to implement anonymous group access of a
shared resource.
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As seen in the Ring Signature Design, the implementation of ring signa-
ture into existing systems using DIDs is easy and requires minimal changes.
However, in all applications the ring sizes must be kept small (below 100) to
keep the resource consumption low. Of course, smaller ring sizes also means
less privacy and therefore, ring signatures use appears to be limited on a
broader scale. Ultimately, the choice of design to use depends on the privacy
requirements of the system and the resource limitations of the devices and a
cost-benefit analysis is advised before making the decision.
Chapter 7
Future Work
The future work includes writing a research paper [6] based on the results of
the thesis and compare the Ring Signature Design with the Multi-DID De-
sign in even more detail. The libraries used in the current implementation,
Hyperledger Indy and Kyber, had some cross-language overheads and there-
fore, the prototypes will be re-implemented with native Java functions to get
both better performance and more accurate measurements for the designs.
Apart from the paper, ring signatures will be examined as a more general
method for anonymous authentication, for example by finding more use cases
where ring signatures are better suited. This thesis used simple ring signa-
tures so another direction to continue would be to use more advanced kinds
of ring signatures such as Linkable Ring Signatures. In the EV charging use
case, linkable ring signatures for the EVs can be used. It is of interest to see
if ring signature performance can be improved, eg. constant sized ring sig-
natures have been proposed by Bose et. al. [12] but neither implementation
nor detailed algorithm is available yet.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
This thesis addresses the problem of revealing of information to the service
through usage of static identifiers. It takes the use case of EV charging and
intends to protect the EVU’s location information from the service providers
(CSO, ER and DSO). A previous privacy preserving solution proposed the
use of different DIDs in every transaction but required the generation and
storage of a large number of DIDs. The goal of this thesis was to study the
use of ring signatures to achieve better privacy with less number of DIDs.
Previous work in this field showed that location privacy in EV charg-
ing is a long-standing issue and various solution have been proposed such
as usage of group signatures, ZKP, escrow, etc. However, most of the solu-
tions were either centralised or resource-intensive and hence unsuitable for
implementation on constrained devices. DIDs and VCs used in the thesis are
still being developed hence relatively less research have been done with these
technologies.
Based on the previous solution of using different DIDs, an efficient and
secure design called the Multi-DID Design was developed for comparison.
Various design choices were made such as the type of DIDs used, credential
format, micropayments design, etc. The Multi-DID design was modified
to create the Ring Signature Design, which uses ring signatures to create
billing evidence such that it protects the exact location of the EVU and yet
allow other parties to prove the location of the transaction at a district level
granularity. The EV and CS prototypes for both designs were implemented
on Android devices which communicate using Bluetooth Low Energy. An
assumption on the number of charging transactions was done based on data
for the country of Norway.
The ring signature performance was measured on various fronts: stor-
age space, processing time, user experience, DID and credential requirement
and billing evidence verification. Measurements showed that ring signatures
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consume both more storage space and processing power as the ring size in-
creases. Although ring signatures require fewer credentials and enable DID
reuse, the resource consumption to generate and verify ring signature more
than outweighs the savings from credentials and DIDs. It was concluded
that ring signatures do provide more privacy but consume significantly more
resources.
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Appendix A
Credentials and Presentations
This section contains the structure of the credentials and presentations used
by the EV and CS in the Multi-DID and Ring Signature Design. As men-
tioned before, the credentials and presentations use the Json-Linked Data
format and the signature suite used is JcsEd25519Signature2020. In the CS
presentation for the Ring Signature Design, the signature suite is denoted as
Ed25519RingSignature.
1
2 {
3 "@context": [
4 "https ://www.w3.org /2018/ credentials/v1",
5 "https ://www.w3.org /2020/ credentials/ev-info/v1"
6 ],
7 "id": "https ://www.w3.org /2020/ credentials/ev-info",
8 "type": [
9 "VerifiableCredential",
10 "EVChargingCredential"
11 ],
12 "credentialSubject": {
13 "id": "EV.did@EV:CS"
14 },
15 "issuer": "ER.did",
16 "issuanceDate": "2020 -12 -31 T00 :00:00Z",
17 "expirationDate": "2020 -12 -31 T23 :59:59Z",
18 "proof": {
19 "type": "JcsEd25519Signature2020",
20 "created": "2020 -12 -31 T00 :00:00Z",
21 "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
22 "verificationMethod": "ER.did#key1",
23 "signatureValue": "eyJhbGciOiJ ... IsImI"
24 }
25 }
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Listing A.1: Structure of the EV credential issued to a EV by the ER. The EV
credential structure is common to both the designs. The EV DID authorised
by the credential is represented by the field credentialSubject. The ER public
DID and the verification key index provided enables other parties to verify
the credential.
1
2 {
3 "@context": [
4 "https ://www.w3.org /2018/ credentials/v1",
5 "https ://www.w3.org /2020/ credentials/cs-info/v1"
6 ],
7 "id": "https ://www.w3.org /2020/ credentials/cs-info",
8 "type": [
9 "VerifiableCredential",
10 "CSInfoCredential"
11 ],
12 "credentialSubject": {
13 "id": "CS.did@EV:CS",
14 "district": "1"
15 },
16 "issuer": "CSO.did",
17 "issuanceDate": "2018 -03 -12 T07 :10:31Z",
18 "expirationDate": "2024 -12 -31 T23 :59:59Z",
19 "proof": {
20 "type": "JcsEd25519Signature2020",
21 "created": "2018 -03 -12 T07 :10:31Z",
22 "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
23 "verificationMethod": "CSO.did#key1",
24 "signatureValue": "JG7JcHzDi ... DzrBar"
25 }
26 }
Listing A.2: Structure of the CS credential issued to a CS by the CSO in
the Multi-DID Design. The CS DID authorised and the CS district location
is represented by the field credentialSubject. The CSO public DID and the
verification key index provided enables other parties to verify the credential.
1
2 {
3 "@context": [
4 "https ://www.w3.org /2018/ credentials/v1",
5 "https ://www.w3.org /2020/ credentials/cs-info/v1"
6 ],
7 "id": "https ://www.w3.org /2020/ credentials/cs-info",
8 "type": [
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9 "VerifiableCredential",
10 "CSInfoCredential"
11 ],
12 "credentialSubject": {
13 "ids": [
14 "CS1.did@EV:CS",
15 "CS2.did@EV:CS",
16 .
17 .
18 .
19 "CS49.did@EV:CS",
20 "CS50.did@EV:CS"
21 ],
22 "district": "1"
23 },
24 "issuer": "CSO.did",
25 "issuanceDate": "2018 -03 -12 T07 :10:31Z",
26 "expirationDate": "2024 -12 -31 T23 :59:59Z",
27 "proof": {
28 "type": "JcsEd25519Signature2020",
29 "created": "2018 -03 -12 T07 :10:31Z",
30 "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
31 "verificationMethod": "CSO.did#key1",
32 "signatureValue": "JG7JcHzDi ... DzrBar"
33 }
34 }
Listing A.3: Structure of the CS credential issued to a CS by the CSO in the
Ring Signature Design. The credential authorises a set of CS DIDs belonging
to CSs in the district specified by the field credentialSubject. The CSO public
DID and the verification key index provided enables other parties to verify
the credential.
1
2 {
3 "presentation": {
4 "@context": [
5 "https ://www.w3.org /2018/ credentials/v1",
6 "https ://www.w3.org /2018/ credentials/examples/v1"
7 ],
8 "id": "urn:uuid :18E15106 -E6DC -4EB5 -8DEB -BFBFAC1C7A7A",
9 "type": [
10 "VerifiablePresentation"
11 ],
12 "ev-did": "EV.did@EV:CS",
13 "proof": [
14 {
15 "type": "Ed25519RingSignature",
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16 "created": "2020 -08 -11 T17 :22:41Z",
17 "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
18 "nonce": 1597155761,
19 "verificationMethod": "CS.credential.id",
20 "signatureValue": "edqw331Si ... gFWd3kLas"
21 }
22 ]
23 }
24 }
Listing A.4: Structure of the CS presentation in the Ring Signature Design,
created by the CS for the EV as proof of possession of the CS Credential
and the ownership of one of the CS DIDs mentioned in the credential. The
proof field contains a Ring Signature created by the key associated with
the CS DID. The signature is created on the EV DID which proves the
intended recipient of the presentation. The verification method is defined
as the CS Credential Id which specifies the signer anonymity set. The CS
presentation in the Multi-DID Design has the same structure but with the
JcsEd25519Signature2020 suite and CS DID as the verification method.
1
2 {
3 "presentation": {
4 "@context": [
5 "https ://www.w3.org /2018/ credentials/v1",
6 "https ://www.w3.org /2018/ credentials/examples/v1",
7
8 ],
9 "id": "urn:uuid :13CB2439 -CA8F -46FB -95B8 -3 F6F0642B9B8",
10 "type": [
11 "VerifiablePresentation",
12
13 ],
14 "commitment": {
15 "cs-signature": {
16 "ev -did": "EV.did@EV:CS",
17 "proof": [
18 {
19 "type": "Ed25519RingSignature",
20 "created": "2020 -08 -11 T17 :22:41Z",
21 "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
22 "nonce": 1597155761,
23 "verificationMethod": "CS.credential.id",
24 "signatureValue": "edqw331Si ... gFWd3kLas"
25 }
26 ]
27 },
28 "w0": 527436582692,
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29 "alg": "SHA -256" ,
30 "n": 50,
31 "p": 0.20
32 },
33 "proof": [
34 {
35 "type": "JcsEd25519Signature2020",
36 "created": "2020 -12 -31 T09 :20:12Z",
37 "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
38 "nonce": 1597155761,
39 "verificationMethod": "EV.did@EV:CS",
40 "signatureValue": "eyJ0eXAi ... gFWFOEjXk"
41 }
42 ]
43 }
44 }
Listing A.5: Structure of the Payment Commitment in the Ring Signature
Design, created by the EV for the CS as proof of possession of the EV Cre-
dential and to commit the payment details. The cs-signature field inside
commitment contains the EV DID and Ring Signature from the CS pre-
sentation. The proof field for the Payment Commitment contains a regular
signature by the key associated with EV DID to authenticate the commit-
ment. The CS presentation in the Multi-DID Design has the same structure
except for the cs-signature field which is replaced a with cs-did field and
contains just the CS DID instead of a Ring Signature
